Caporetto at sea: The Battle of Cape Matapan, March 1941

David R. Higgins © 2002

TXu1-045-611 May 1, 2002

Back to Higgins Studios

Article Ships/Maps Chronology Bibliography

“It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It would take three hundred to rebuild a tradition.”- Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet

Prelude to Cape Matapan

By June 1940, much of Western Europe finds itself under enemy occupation following two months of rapid, deep-penetrating thrusts by German combined-arms air and land forces. When in early June the British Expeditionary Force is expelled from Dunkirk, England finds itself isolated and ripe for a suspected sea-borne invasion merely nine months into the Second World War. With the island country’s strategic defense resting essentially with its navy, Britain looks to continue the fight at sea and keep its vital shipping routes open; especially to the Arabian oil fields. Italy’s June 11 war entry with the axis and French capitulation shortly thereafter, the Royal Navy’s presence in the Mediterranean becomes even more challenging and desperate. Not only must the now neutral French fleet be kept from the enemy but, more importantly, the Italian’s more modernized ships must be countered for Britain to retain control of the area.

Faced with these new concerns, the Western Mediterranean is controlled by Vice-Admiral Sir James Sommerville’s Force H at Gibraltar while the main naval base leaves Malta (thought indefensible before the war) for the more distant and subsequently safer port at Alexandria, Egypt. From this recently-subdued French port, Cunningham retains communication with the important logistic hub of Malta; but with the tiny island’s regular aerial bombing, its untenability as a British base fast becomes a reality. A steady stream of men and material is continually convoyed in as support while badly needed equipment and technical services, to help modernize the underdeveloped base at Alexandria, are sent out. Before long these convoys are seen as opportunistic targets for the Regia Marina (Italian Navy) that intervenes off Calabria on July 9, 1940; but when the Italian flagship is hit from the escorting Warspite 13 miles away the Italians are shaken and break contact. Although a draw, the battle gives the slower, under-gunned, and outnumbered British a sense of power when facing the Italians on equal terms and helps set the tone for future Italian/British conflicts.

Concern that the Royal Navy is unequal to the task of defeating the Regia Marina’s 15-inch battleships, Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, Cunningham requests, and is given, the modernized Valiant, sister ship to Warspite. The converted anti-aircraft cruisers Calcutta and Coventry are also sent in alongside the armored aircraft carrier Illustrious, giving badly-needed air cover to the British Eastern Mediterranean fleet. With Illustrious and Valiant equipped with radar, the Royal Navy/ Regia Marina power balance is significantly righted for the British who look to exploit their newfound strength. On November 11, 1940 the chance arrives when Illustrious comes within 170 miles Taranto’s harbor to launch 21 Swordfish, torpedo planes against the Italian’s entire complement of six battleships; their support craft at anchor nearby. This first ever carrier-based attack completely surprises the Italians who quickly find their battleship, Conte di Cavour, sunk by torpedo and the Caio Littorio and Duilio put out of action. Ever cautious, and now with their morale shaken, the Supermarina (Italian Naval High Command) orders many of their ships into ever more distant and safer waters as a precaution. In an effort to hold off a growing fuel shortage and a reluctance to enter a direct fight with the Royal Navy, this half-measure gives the British valuable breathing room and an opportunity to solidify its Mediterranean position.

Buildup

To help counter Supermarina’s indecisive nature and make up for recent Italian reverses in Greece and North Africa, the German Secretary of State for Air, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, travels to Italy in December, 1940 and arranges Luftwaffe support for the Mediterranean theater. Fliegerkorps X subsequently transfers to Sicily bolstering the Regia Aeronautica’s (Italian Air Force) Eastern Mediterranean presence and participating in the axis air operations in December, 1940 – January, 1941, operation MITTELMEER. These German anti-shipping specialists, nicknamed CAT (Corpo Aereo Tedesco), are primarily responsible for supporting the newly arriving German Afrika Korps in North Africa and helping subdue the nagging British presence in Malta. With the Regia Aeronautica lacking maritime combat experience and the Regia Marina without suitable night fighting capabilities or aircraft carriers¹, the support is extremely beneficial. Although strong in dive-bomber support, Fliegerkorps X is without authority over torpedo planes which are instead placed under Luftwaffe chief Goering’s direct control. This tactical miscalculation only furthers the communication problems between the Italian naval and axis air units and their higher commands.

Throughout January British Air Intelligence stays informed about this movement of enemy air units via ULTRA² transmissions, but they are surprised by how quickly so many Germans arrive in the area. Between January 5-8, 1941 96 German bombers are brought into the Mediterranean theater and by month’s end the count totals 120 long-range bombers, 150 dive-bombers and 48 fighters. When this force makes its first appearance on January 10, the British realize they are confronted by an aggressive and professional enemy as clusters of circling German Ju-88’s and 87’s relentlessly bombard Illustrious, Warspite, and Valiant while on convoy patrol. The battleships receive superficial damage, but Illustrious is crippled by 6 direct bomb hits and limps into Malta before sailing to the United States and more permanent repairs. Without a carrier C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir A. B. Cunningham’s plans for upcoming anti-shipping missions are out of the question and his fleet returns to Alexandria.

Convoys on both sides repeatedly cross paths as the Germans supply the Afrika Korps through the Sicilian route and the British reinforce their positions in Greece as part of Operation LUSTRE starting March 4. Concerned but undeterred, Cunningham accepts the risky mission of convoy patrol and waits expectantly for Illustrious’ replacement, Formidable. To compound the admiral’s problems British First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, is of the opinion that the Mediterranean is secondary in importance to the Atlantic which results in Cunningham’s resources remaining severely limited. When Formidable finally arrives through the Suez Canal on March 16, the badly needed carrier quickly joins up with the Alexandria-based Warspite, Valiant, and the lightly-modernized Barham and prepares for action.

After four months of inactivity the Italians finally devise an offensive operation as a result of increasing German pressure to be more aggressive and a desire to regain prestige lost at Taranto and elsewhere. On March 15, 1941 the Commander-in-Chief Italian Fleet, Admiral Angelo Iachino arrives in Rome to discuss plans for disrupting British troops and material flowing into Greece. Deciding on an anti-convoy scenario comprising an Italian battleship force along with cruisers and destroyers the Italians will sweep north and south of Crete while Fliegerkorps X and the Regia Aeronautica will provide air cover and reconnaissance. Although originally discussed during the previous month’s Merano³ conference as a component of a broader and more strategic axis Mediterranean goal, the Italians are wary of British air superiority around Greece and Crete and the raid remains limited in scope. These fears, however, are greatly lessened by a recent and erroneous German intelligence report:

“SUBJECT: Naval Strategic Situation in the Mediterranean.

From: German Naval Liaison Officer, Rome.

To: Italian Naval Staff.

Date: March 19, 1941.

The German Naval Staff considers that at the moment there is only one British battleship, Valiant, in the Eastern Mediterranean fully ready for action. It is not anticipated that heavy British units will be withdrawn from the Atlantic in the near future. Force H is also considered unlikely to appear in the Mediterranean.

Thus the situation in the Mediterranean is at the moment more favorable for the Italian Fleet than ever before. Intensive traffic from Alexandria to the Greek ports, whereby the Greek forces are receiving constant reinforcements in men and equipment, presents a particularly worthwhile target for the Italian Naval forces.

The German Naval Staff considers that the appearance of Italian units in the area south of Crete will seriously interfere with British shipping, and may even lead to the complete interruption of the transport of troops, especially as these transports are at the moment inadequately protected.”

Although outwardly optimistic, it appears likely that the Supermarina and the Comandante Superiore in Mare (Task Force Commander), Admiral Eaton, are actually aware of the three active British battleships from Alexandria, but continue with the planned raid. Canceling such an operation is thought to be detrimental to morale since several previous naval sorties had been aborted and the Italians need a victory no matter how small. In addition, the Supermarina wants to change the continuing German perception of an indecisive and timid Italian command. -The plan would go forward with D-Day set for March 28th.

Shortly before the Italians set sail, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Riccardi, and his Operations Officer, Admiral Campioni, receive information that all British convoys between Greece and North Africa have suddenly stopped including the targeted AG.9 from Alexandria to Piraeus and GA.9 from Piraeus to Alexandria. With this unexpected change, the plan’s focus quickly shifts from the initial convoy attack to a Royal Navy encounter that forces Cattaneo’s northern sweep of Crete southward and more in proximity to the main Italian fleet. Iachino, skeptical of the promised Italian and German air support, boards his new, 35,000-ton flagship, Vittorio Veneto, and departs Naples on March 26th. In support the Italian 3rd (Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano), 8th (Garibaldi and Abruzzi), and 1st squadrons (Zara, Pola, and Fiume) depart Messina, Brindisi, and Taranto respectively. Thirteen destroyers round out this three-part force of fast, new ships as they steam southeast in search of prey.

To ascertain whether the British were aware of this large Italian naval force, the Regia Aeronautica increases reconnaissance patrols southwest of Greece and Crete, but finds nothing unusual. At 1225 on the 27th Trieste informs Iachino that its cruiser group under Vice-Admiral Luigi Sansonetti has been spotted by a patrolling British Sunderland. Not long after accurate and timely cryptanalysis aboard Vittorio Veneto deciphers the enemy plane’s message, the Italian admiral is pleased to hear that only three Italian cruisers and a destroyer have been spotted in the midday scirocco wind. To give the impression that the North African coast at Cyrenaica is Iachino’s true destination, the admiral alters his fleet’s course from 120° to a more southerly 150°; but the British plane mistakenly reports a more easterly direction and the deception is for naught. Later that afternoon a report from one of the daily Regia Aeronautica flights over Alexandria still finds three battleships, two aircraft carriers, and several cruisers sitting contently in port and the Italian fleet continues on believing the Royal Navy will remain inactive for the foreseeable future.

Even after several accurate ULTRA transmissions and the recent Sunderland sighting, Cunningham remains unsure as to the complete picture and doubts the Italians will make a showing in force. Not wanting British convoys to be taken by surprise, AG9 is to deceptively continue towards its destination of Piraeus before turning back after nightfall while convoy GA9 is to remain in port. Cunningham then sets about mobilizing British air and naval units for rapid deployment while trying to keep the Italians (and axis spies) in the dark as to his preparations.

Orders are sent out to Force B under Vice-Admiral Land Forces (VALF) H.D. Pridham-Wippell directing him to sail his patrolling 7th Cruiser Squadron of Orion, Ajax, Perth, Gloucester and 2 destroyers from the Aegean Sea to a position 30 miles southwest of Crete near Guado island. Enroute the Suda Bay destroyers Hereward and Vendetta will join up with Cunningham’s force, including Force C (Nubian, Mohawk, Havock, Hotspur, and Greyhound) at 0630 on the 28th. In reserve Juno, Jaguar, and Defender will remain in the Kythera Channel while the patrolling submarine’s Rover and Triumph, and a mixed bag of Greek units will provide support as needed. Thirty Blenheim bombers from Squadrons 84, 113, and 221 are also readied in Greece with the RAF giving maximum aerial reconnaissance in the south Ionian Sea. This plan is eventually broadened when Cunningham receives an early ULTRA message on March 27th confirming sizeable Italian naval forces are involved. The three Royal Navy battleships and aircraft carrier in Alexandria will now be utilized as well while the destroyers of Force C (plus Jervis, Janus, Stuart, and Griffin) will be used as the Battle fleet’s forward screen. The rendezvous with Pridham-Whippell is consequently altered to an area just south of Crete at 1700 on the 28th...